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Ernest E. Figari, Jr.*
M AJOR developments in the field of civil procedure during the survey
period include judicial decisions, statutory enactments,1 and amend-
ments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. 2 This Survey will examine
these developments and consider their impact on existing Texas procedure.
I. JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
The most significant development in the area of jurisdiction over the per-
son was the enactment of a marital long-arm statute.8 The enactment was
encouraged 4 by the recent decision of the Texas Supreme Court in Mitchim
v. Mitchim,5 which recognized the assertion of marital long-arm jurisdiction
by another state. Service had previously been effected over a Texas resident
by an Arizona court under its long-arm procedure and, after the Texas de-
fendant failed to appear, a judgment had been obtained against him for ali-
mony, attorney's fees, and costs. Later, suit was filed by the defendant in
Texas seeking a declaration that the Arizona court had no jurisdiction to ren-
der a personal judgment against him. Reversing the holding of the lower
courts that the Arizona judgment was void, the supreme court concluded that
courts must recognize the assertion of marital long-arm jurisdiction by an-
other state, provided the required minimum contacts existed between that
state and the nonresident.6
* B.S., Texas A & M University; LL.B., University of Texas; LL.M., Southern
Methodist University. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
1. The enactments which have procedural implications principally concern jurisdic-
tion of the person, TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.26, 11.051 (Supp. 1975-76); limitations,
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.82 (Supp. 1975-76); interest on judgments, TEX. REV. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.05 (Supp. 1975-76); sequestration, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 6840 (Supp. 1975-76); and appellate jurisdiction of the district court in probate mat-
ters, TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5 (Supp. 1975-76).
2. As a result of the amendments, 36 Texas Rules of Civil Procedure were modi-
fied, 4 new rules were added, and 16 rules were repealed. These changes became ef-
fective January 1, 1976. See Civil Procedure Rules Amended, 38 TEX. B.J. 823 (1975).
3. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.26 (Supp. 1975-76). Although of lesser significance,
it should be noted that a parent-child long-arm statute was also enacted during the sur-
vey period. See id. § 11.051. Prior to the enactment of these long-arm statutes in the
family law field, Texas long-arm statutes dealt only with service of process upon nonresi-
dents and foreign corporations engaged in business within the state, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 203 lb (1964), and upon nonresident drivers involved in litigation arising from
their use of the state's streets and highways, id. § 2039a.
4. See Sampson, Long-Arm Jurisdiction Marries the Texas Family Code, 38 TEX.
B.J. 1023, 1026 (1975).
5. 518 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1975).
6. Id. at 364-65. The supreme court also noted and discussed the trend among
other states toward the enactment of marital long-arm statutes. Id. at 365. See, e.g.,
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-308 (Supp. 1974); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-355 (1974), § 25-521
(1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1701.03(a)(7) (Supp. 1975); WiS. STAT. §
247.055, 247.057, 262.05 (Supp. 1975); interpreted and discussed in Scott v. Hall, 203
Kan. 331, 454 P.2d 449 (1969); Stucky v. Stucky, 186 Neb. 636, 185 N.W.2d 656
(1971); Hines v. Clendenning, 465 P.2d 460 (Okla. 1970); Dillon v. Dillon, 46 Wis.
2d 659, 176 N.W.2d 362 (1970).
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Following the suggestion of Mitchim, section 3.26 of the Texas Family
Code was amended. It provides that if the petitioner is a resident of Texas
at the commencement of an action for divorce or annulment or a suit to de-
clare a marriage void, the court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident respondent if "this state is the last state in which marital cohabi-
tation between petitioner and the respondent occurred and the suit is com-
menced within two years after the date on which the cohabitation ended"
or "there is any basis consistent with the constitution of this state or the
United States for the exercise of the personal jurisdiction. ''7
The attorney representing a nonresident defendant who is served under
article 2031b,8 Texas' first long-arm statute, who finds himself short on
time, can take comfort from Omniplan, Inc. v. New America Development
Corp.9 Rule 120a, 10 which originally established the conditions of a special
appearance to challenge personal jurisdiction, required that such an appear-
ance "be made by sworn motion filed prior to . . .any other plea, pleading
or motion." In Omniplan the court concluded that an attorney's informal
request of opposing counsel, made to secure an extension of time in which
to file a pleading, and unaccompanied by the filing of a motion, did not con-
stitute a general appearance resulting in a waiver of the nonresident defend-
ant's right to challenge jurisdiction over his person.
Omniplan also delineates the requirements of a verification of a special
appearance motion. Faced with a motion containing a jurat by defendant's
counsel stating " 'that the allegations of fact contained therein are true and
correct,' "I' the court concluded that rule 120a did not require that the veri-
fication affirmatively show on its face that it was made on personal knowl-
edge. In this respect, the importance of the holding in Omniplan may have
been diminished by the amendment of rule 120a. Significantly, when a spe-
cial appearance motion is deficient in some respect, rule 120a now permits
the motion to be amended to cure the defect. 12
The new amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which be-
7. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.26 (Supp. 1975-76) provides in full that:
(a) If the petitioner is a resident or a domiciliary of this state at the com-
mencement of a suit for divorce, annulment, or to declare a marriage void,
the court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the respondent, or the re-
spondent's personal representative, although the respondent is not a resi-
dent or a domiciliary of this state if:
(1) this state is the last state in which marital cohabitation between
petitioner and the respondent occurred and the suit is commenced
within two years after the date on which cohabitation ended; or(2) notwithstanding Subdivision (1) above, there is any basis con-
sistent with the constitution of this state or the United States for the
exercise of the personal jurisdiction.
(b) A court acquiring jurisdiction under this section also acquires juris-
diction in a suit affecting the parent-child relation if Section 11.051 of this
code is applicable.
See McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 103 (1975).
8. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (1964).
9. 523 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ).
10. TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a (1967).
11. 523 S.W.2d at 304.
12. TEX. R. Civ. P. 120a. As originally adopted, rule 120a contained no specific




came effective January 1, 1976, made several changes in the area of jurisdic-
tion over the person. Before the amendments, where personal service on
a resident defendant was not practical, rule 106"1 authorized the trial court
to order substituted service. Such service could be made by leaving a copy
of the citation, with petition attached, at the usual place of business of the
defendant to be served, or by delivering it to any one over sixteen years
of age at the defendant's usual place of abode. 14  Adding to the specified
methods of service, rule 1061" now provides that substituted service may also
be effected "by registered or certified mail."
Prior to its recent amendment, rule 10816 had been interpreted to provide
for notice to a nonresident or absent defendant in an action involving prop-
erty situated within Texas. 17 As thus interpreted, the rule dealt exclusively
with notice to defendants in actions in which Texas courts had in rem juris-
diction. Intending to permit acquisition of personal jurisdiction to the consti-
tutional limits, rule 10818 was amended to authorize service on a nonresident
or absent defendant "to the full extent that he may be required to appear
and answer under the Constitution of the United States in an action either
in rem or in personam." If amended rule 108 is held to enlarge the existing
framework of Texas long-arm statutes, however, it could prove constitution-
ally defective. 19
Whenever a citation by publication is authorized 2 0 rule 109a t x which is
completely new, permits the trial court, on motion, to "prescribe a different
method of substituted service" if the court finds "that the method so pre-
scribed would be as likely as publication to give defendant actual notice."
II. VENUE
Aimed at eliminating distant forum abuses in consumer transactions, 22 sub-
division 5 of article 199523 was amended in 1973 to provide that in an action
upon a contract arising out of a "consumer transaction," suit by a creditor
upon the contract may be brought against the defendant either in the county
in which the defendant signed the contract or in the county in which the
defendant resides at the time of the commencement of the action. Interpret-
ing amended subdivision 5 for the first time are Castleberry v. Acco Feeds24
13. TEX. R. Civ. P. 106 (1967).
14. In both its present and earlier form TEx. R. Civ. P. 106 also generally allows
the court to order substituted service "in any other manner which will be reasonably
effective to give defendant notice of the suit."
15. TEx. R. Civ. P. 106.
16. TEX. R. Civ. P. 108 (1967).
17. See, e.g., Roumel v. Drill Well Oil Co., 270 F.2d 550 (5th Cir. 1959); Aamco
Automatic Transmissions, Inc. v. Evans Advertising Agency, Inc., 450 S.W.2d 769 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
18. TEX. R. Civ. P. 108.
19. See letter from Hans W. Baade to the Texas Bar lournal, 38 Tax. B.J. 988
(1975). But see Sampson, supra note 4, at 1033 n.20.
20. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 109, 110, 111, 113, 117a.
21. TEX. R. Civ. P. 109a.
22. See Sampson, Distant Forum Abuse in Consumer Transactions: A Proposed So-
lution, 51 TEXAs L. REV. 269 (1973).
23. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, subd. 5(b) (Supp. 1975-76).
24. 525 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975, no writ).
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and Amaya v. Texas Securities Corp.25 In Castleberry a "consumer transac-
tion" was held to include the purchase by an individual of feed to be used
in a ranching operation consisting of 3,000 acres of land and $350,000 worth
of cattle.26 Similarly, in Amaya a contract for paving improvements to the
street abutting the defendants' home was held to arise out of a "consumer
transaction" within the meaning of subdivision 5.27
The venue treatment of ancillary claims received substantial attention
during the survey period. Section 2(g) of the Texas comparative negligence
statute, 28 which provides that "[a]ll claims for contribution between named
defendants in the primary suit shall be determined in the primary suit," was
recently construed. Joining with an earlier case, 29 LaSorsa v. Burr30 held
that section 2(g) is a mandatory venue provision8' and that where a cross-
claim for contribution is asserted between defendants, the crossclaim is to
be tried in the county where the court hearing the main suit is situated.8 2
Hurst v. Stewart38 is also instructive in determining the venue of an an-
cillary claim. Considering a plea of privilege asserted by a plaintiff to a
claim in intervention, the court held that the venue of the intervenor's claim
cannot be challenged when it arises out of or is incidental to the subject mat-
ter of the plaintiff's claim.8 4 Similarly, the court in Miller v. Brown35 con-
cluded that where venue of the primary claim is proper as to both defendants,
venue will be proper in the same county as to all crossclaims arising out
of the same transaction as the primary claim.86
Venue of a suit brought against a national banking association is gov-
erned by federal statute.17 As a result, it is well established that a suit
against a national bank must be brought in the county of its domicile.' s
Nevertheless, overruling a national bank's plea of privilege in an action
brought against it for wrongful garnishment, the Fort Worth court of civil
appeals recently concluded that the bank's unlawful conduct in the county
of suit constituted a waiver of its federal venue rights.39
III. PLEADINGS
Rule 18540 provides that when any action is founded upon an open ac-
25. 527 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (2-1
decision).
26. 525 S.W.2d at 285.
27. 527 S.W.2d at 222.
28. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2212a, § 2(g) (Supp. 1975-76).
29. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Edwards, 512 S.W.2d 748 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Tyler 1974, no writ).
30. 516 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ).
31. See TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, subd. 30 (1964); see, e.g. Langdeau
v. Burke Inv. Co., 163 Tex. 526, 358 S.W.2d 553 (1962).
32. 516 S.W.2d at 269-70.
33. 526 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, writ dism'd).
34. Id. at 670.
35. 528 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, no writ).
36. Id. at 110.
37. 12 U.S.C. § 94 (1970).
38. See, e.g., Mercantile Nat'l Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555 (1963).
39. Texas Commerce Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Tripp, 516 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Fort Worth 1974, writ granted).
40. T x. R. Civ. P. 185.
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count "on which a systematic record has been kept" and is supported by the
affidavit of the plaintiff to the effect that the claim is "just or true" and
"due" and that "all just and lawful offsets, payments and credits have been
allowed," the sworn account "shall be taken as prima facie evidence thereof."
The Dallas court of civil appeals reiterated that in order for a sworn account
to be accorded the evidentiary effect afforded by rule 185, the account must
show on its face with reasonable certainty the nature of each item sold, the
date of each sale and the reasonable charge therefor.41 As a result of the
failure to so specify, a general denial was held sufficient to put the matters
in issue such that a summary judgment was not proper. Two other cases42
during the survey period concluded that where the obligation alleged in the
petition did not conform to the account attached as an exhibit to the petition,
the account controlled over the allegations in the petition.
IV. LIMITATIONS
The "discovery of the cause of action rule," which has been held applicable
to several types of actions, 43 established that the pertinent statute of limita-
tions would not commence to run until the discovery of the true facts giving
rise to the claimed damage, or on the date discovery should reasonably have
been made. Superseding the "discovery of the cause of action rule" in medi-
cal malpractice cases, the Texas Insurance Code has been amended to pro-
vide,
[N]o claim against a person or hospital covered by a policy of profes-
sional liability insurance covering a person licensed to practice medi-
cine or podiatry or certified to administer anesthesia in this state or a
hospital licensed under the Texas Hospital Licensing Law, as amended,
whether for breach of express or implied contract or tort, for compen-
sation for medical treatment or hospitalization may be commenced
unless the action is filed within two years of the breach or the tort com-
plained of or from the date of the medical treatment that is the subject
of the claim or the hospitalization for which the claim is made is com-
pleted . . .44
Since virtually all physicians and hospitals providing medical treatment main-
tain professional liability insurance, a claim for malpractice against a physi-
cian or hospital must be filed within two years from the date of the treat-
41. Unit, Inc. v. Ten Eyck-Shaw, Inc., 524 S.W.2d 330, 333 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The courts of civil appeals have often similarly stated
the requirement. See, e.g., Big K Furniture Co. v. Covey Co., 511 S.W.2d 329, 330
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, no writ); United States Insulation Sales Corp. v. Jones-
Blair Co., 491 S.W.2d 226, 227 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, no writ).
42. Hassler v. Texas Gypsum Co., 525 S.W.2d 53, 54 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1975, no writ); Dean v. K-C Fuel Co., 524 S.W.2d 805, 806 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1975, no writ).
43. See Thrift v. Tenneco Chems., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Tex. 1974) (breach
of warranty by drug manufacturer); Hays v. Hall, 488 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. 1972) (unsuc-
cessful vasectomy by physician); Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1967) (foreign
object left in body by surgeon); Atkins v. Crosland, 417 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. 1967) (negli-
gent preparation of tax return by accountant). See also Perdue, The Law of Texas Med-
ical Malpractice, 11 Hous. L. REV. 825, 839 (1974); Note, Limitation of Actions, 46
TFxs L. REv. 119 (1967).
44. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 5.82, § 4 (Supp. 1975-76) (emphasis added).
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ment for which damages are being sought, irrespective of when the true facts
giving rise to the claimed damages were, or should have been, discovered.
Section 2.725 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code45 provides that
"[a]n action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within
four years after the cause of action has accrued." The supreme court has
authoritatively ruled that section 2.725 extends to four years the statute of
limitations applicable to an open account or oral contract for the sale of goods
and materials .4  However, the supreme court cautions that suits on sworn
account which are not founded on breach of a "contract for sale"47 are not
governed by section 2.725.
V. PARTIES
Williams v. Saxon,4 8 following in the footsteps of an earlier case,19 empha-
sizes the liberality of rule 3950 as regards joinder of parties. The purchaser
brought suit against the husband for specific performance of a contract to
convey certain community property. Appealing from a judgment in favor
of the purchaser, the husband contended that his wife was an indispensable
party to the action, since it involved community property which constituted
the family homestead, and that failure to join the wife rendered the judgment
void. Concluding that rule 39 permitted the resolution of the action without
the joinder of the wife, the court held that the judgment was valid and bind-
ing upon the husband except to the extent that it might have to be disre-
garded in according the wife her homestead rights. 5 '
Two cases which may be of interest to the estate practitioner are Jen-
nings v. Srp52 and Martinez v. Angerstein5 3 The conclusion of the court
45. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.725 (1968).
46. Big D Serv. Co. v. Climatrol Indus., Inc., 523 S.W.2d 236 (Tex. 1975), refusing
application for writ of error, 514 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974); accord,
Wilson v. Browning Arms Co., 501 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1973, writ ref'd); Ideal Builders Hardware Co. v. Cross Constr. Co., 491 S.W.2d 228
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1972, no writ); see Spies, Uniform Commercial
Code: Article 2-Sales; Performance and Remedies, 44 TEXAs L. REV. 629, 638-39
(1966); Teofan, Commercial Transactions, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J.
88, 93 (1969).
47. TEx. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.106 (1968) provides that a "'[c]ontract
for sale' includes both a present sale of goods and a contract to sell goods at a future
time." Further, "'[g]oods' means all things (including specially manufactured goods)
which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the
money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities . . . and things in action."
Id. § 2.105.
48. 521 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, no writ).
49. Cooper v. Texas Gulf Indus., Inc., 513 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. 1974), noted in 52
TEXAs L. REV. 1410 (1974).
50. TEx. R. Civ. P. 39.
51. In the action against the husband, the jury found that the property in question
did not have a homestead character at the time the contract to convey was executed.
However, this finding was held not to be binding on the wife, who was not named as
a party, and as between her interests and those of the purchaser, the issue of abandon-
ment of a homestead claim must be heard in another case. 521 S.W.2d at 90-91. Even
if found to be homestead property in such a later suit, contrary to the earlier ruling, spe-
cific performance may still be ordered if it is found that both spouses have joined in
the contract to convey the homestead. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.81 (1975); Allen
v. Monk, 505 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. 1974), noted in 28 Sw. L.J. 787 (1974).
52. 521 S.W.2d 326 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, no writ). See also
Crickmer v. King, 507 S.W.2d 314 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, no writ).
53. 517 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, writ dism'd).
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in Jennings is that all devisees and legatees named in a will are indispensable
parties to an action to contest the will, and additionally, when a construction
or contest of the will would result in any of the estate passing by intestate
succession, the heirs at law of the decedent are also indispensable parties
to the action. Martinez reiterates that an action to recover funeral expenses
and damages for pain and suffering survives to the heir or legal representa-
tives of the decedent and that they are, therefore, indispensable parties to
such action.
VI. DISCOVERY
The most significant case during the survey period dealing with discovery
is Ex parte Butler.54 The state brought suit against an individual defendant
seeking injunctive relief and civil penalties. During the taking of his deposi-
tion, the defendant refused to answer a question on the grounds that it might
tend to incriminate him. After warning the defendant of the probable conse-
quences if he should persist in his refusal, and still obtaining no answer, the
trial court found him in contempt and assessed his punishment at three days
in jail and a fine of $100. Granting the defendant's petition for writ of ha-
beas corpus, the supreme court recognized the application of the privilege
against self-incrimination to a civil proceeding. The court's holding fell into
several categories. First, since the suit is a civil action, the state may prop-
erly call the defendant as a witness or take his deposition. Upon becoming
a witness, however, the defendant does not lose his right against self-incrimi-
nation. Second, when a witness invokes his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion and refuses to answer, the trial court must determine whether the re-
fusal is justified. Before the witness is compelled to answer, the trial court
must conclude, from a careful consideration of all of the circumstances, that
the witness is mistaken and that the answer cannot possibly have a tendency
to incriminate.55 Third, the invocation of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion must be predicated upon the threat of criminal penalties, not upon a
threat of civil penalties.
Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Thomas56 is an indication that the
duty imposed by rule 16857 to supplement answers to interrogatories may
be without sanction. Prior to trial the defendant had served extensive inter-
rogatories upon the plaintiff, including one inquiring whether the plaintiff had
employed any experts to testify at the trial. The interrogatory was answered
in the negative. Although the answer was correct at the time it was made,
two months later the plaintiff engaged an expert witness to testify at the trial.
When the expert was called to testify at the trial, the defendant filed a motion
for a mistrial or, in the alternative, that the expert not be allowed to testify.
Acknowledging that the plaintiff should have supplemented his answer after
engaging the expert, the appellate court nevertheless concluded that no ex-
54. 522 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. 1975).
55. Id. at 198; see Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951). See also
Kaminsky, Preventing Unfair Use of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Private
Civil Litigation: A Critical Analysis, 39 BROOKLYN L. REV. 121, 136 (1972).
56. 517 S.W.2d 832 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
57. TEX. R. Civ. P. 168.
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press sanction is provided by rule 168 for the failure to supplement an an-
swer, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant
a mistrial and in permitting the expert to testify, primarily because no new
evidence was brought into the case through his testimony.
Favoring substance over form in deposition practice is Hill v. Rich,58 a
recent decision of the Austin court of civil appeals. The deposition of one
of the plaintiffs, though properly taken and certified by the reporter, had
not been signed at the time of its use at the hearing on the defendant's motion
for summary judgment. Following the hearing, which resulted in a judgment
in favor of the defendant, the deponent signed and filed his deposition with-
out change. The plaintiffs contended on appeal that the deposition was in-
competent to prove anything because at the time of the hearing it had not
been sworn to or filed. Overruling this contention, the court held that the
"[i]ere lack of signature will not justify suppression of a deposition, even
when timely motion is made, unless the reasons for not signing impugn the
verity or reliability of the deposition." 59
The circumstances under which a trial court may allow a party to change
his answers to interrogatories and replies to requests for admissions were con-
sidered in Thomas v. International Insurance Co.60 'During the course of
the trial, at the request of the defendant, the trial court permitted the defend-
ant to change its answer to a certain interrogatory and request for admission,
both of which pertained to a material issue in the action.0 ' The trial court
also ordered plaintiff's counsel not to make any reference to the jury that
the answers had been changed. 2 As a result, the amended answers were
read to the jury and the jury was never informed that the answers had been
changed. Implying that the defendant's request was not timely, the appel-
late court concluded that "it was error for the trial court to forbid the Plain-
tiff from offering evidence to explain to the jury the reasons behind the
changed answers" and that "[t]he Plaintiff should have been permitted to
impeach the Defendant's changed answers by a showing of the former an-
swers, as well as the purported basis for changing the answers, just as im-
peachment would be proper for any other prior inconsistent statement." 63
Rule 16864 authorizes the service of written interrogatories "[a]t any time
after a party has made appearance in the cause, or time therefor has elapsed
58. 522 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
59. Id. at 600.
60. 527 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
61. It should be noted that TEX. R. Civ. P. 168, which governs interrogatory prac-
tice, provides that "a party is under a duty seasonably to amend his answer if he obtains
information upon the basis of which (a) he knows that the answer was incorrect when
made, or (b) he knows that the answer though correct when made is no longer true
and the circumstances are such that a failure to amend the answer is in substance a
knowing concealment." With respect to the amendment of answers to requests for ad-
missions, TEx. R. Civ. P. 169 empowers the trial court to permit such amendment "when
the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the party who
obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will
prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense on the merits."
62. Neither TEX. R. Crv. P. 168 nor 169 expressly authorize the trial court to sup-
press a reference to the change. Cf. TEX. R. CIv P. 167a.
63. 527 S.W.2d at 820.
64. TEX. R. Crv. P. 168.
[ol. 30
TEXAS CIVIL PROCEDURE
S.. " Refusing to interpret rule 168 literally, the court in Ana-Log, Inc.
v. City of Tyler65 concluded that interrogatories filed in connection with a
motion for new trial were improper on the basis that the use of the discovery
rules is limited to pretrial proceedings. 66
The trial lawyer anticipating litigation with the state should not overlook
the Texas Open Records Act, article 6252-17(a), 67 as a means of discovery
prior to suit.68  Declaring that "all persons are . at all times entitled to
full and complete information regarding the affairs of government,"69 the Act
provides that "[o]n application for public information to the custodian of
information in a governmental body by any person, the custodian shall
promptly produce such information for inspection or duplication, or both, in
the offices of the governmental body."' 70 Significantly, "[n]either the cus-
todian nor his agent who controls the use of public records shall make any
inquiry of any person who applies for inspection or copying of public records
beyond the purpose of establishing the proper identification and the public
records being requested .... "71 When a request for records is made under
the Act, however, one case 72 during the survey period has held that the gov-
ernmental body is entitled to obtain in advance -the "actual cost" of providing
copies of such records.
The recent amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure have also
had an impact on deposition practice. Rule 215c, 78 which is completely new,
provides that any party may cause the testimony at a deposition to be re-
corded on videotape or other non-stenographic means, without leave of court,
and such recording may be presented at trial in lieu of reading from the writ-
ten record of the deposition. Any party intending to make a videotape or
other non-stenographic recording of a deposition is required to give five days
notice of such intention to all other parties by certified mail, return receipt
requested. The expense of the non-stenographic recording is not a taxable
cost unless, before the deposition is taken, the parties so agree or the court
65. 520 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, no writ).
66. But see TEX. R. Civ. P. 621a.
67. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17(a) (Supp. 1975-76). See also Freedom
of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (Supp. 1975).
68. See Comment, Right to Information and the FOIA: Shredding the Paper Cur-
tain of Secrecy, 11 Hous. L. REv. 717 (1974); Comment, Freedom of Information Act
and Its Internal Memoranda Exemption: Time for a Practical Approach, 27 Sw. L.J.
806 (1973); Comment, Texas Open Records Act: Law Enforcement Agencies' Investi-
gatory Records, 29 Sw. L.J. 431 (1975). But see TEx. Arr'y GEN. OP. No. H-483
(1974).
69. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17(a), § I (Supp. 1975-76).
70. Id. § 4.
71. Id. § 5(b).
72. Hendricks v. Trustees of Spring Branch, 525 S.W.2d 930, 932 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
73. TEx. R. Civ. P. 215c. For recent relevant articles on this subject see Kennelly,
The Practical Uses of Trialvision and Depovision, in 16 J. KENNELLY, TRIAL LAWYER'S
GUIDE 183 (1972); Brennan, Videotape-The Michigan Experience, 24 HAsTIrGs L.J.
1 (1972); Kornblum, Videotape in Civil Cases, 24 HASTINGs L.J. 9 (1972); McGill &
Thrasher, Videotapes: The Reel Thing of the Future, 11 TRIAL 43 (1975); Merlo &
Sorenson, Videotape: The Coming Courtroom Tool, 7 TRIAL 55 (1971); Miller, Video-
taping the Oral Deposition, 18 PRAC. LAW. 45 (1972); Comment, Videotape Evidence:
Technological Innovation in the Trial Process, 36 ALA. LAw. 228 (1975). Note that
the requirement of a written record under Tx. R. Crv. P. 206 greatly diminishes the
value of non-stenographic recording.
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so-orders on motion and notice. Generally, the making of a non-steno-
graphic recording will not dispense with the requirement of a written record
of the deposition.
VII. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The intricacy of summary judgment procedure is illustrated by Zale Corp.
v. Rosenbaum.14  Plaintiff brought suit against defendants for alleged negli-
gent construction of a building which resulted in flood damage. Defendants
denied liability, and asserted the two-year statute of limitations as an affirma-
tive defense. The plaintiff sought to defeat the limitations defense by urging
that it had exercised diligence in procuring issuance and service of citation,
and that the limitations period had been suspended as a result of the defend-
ants' absence from the state. Granting defendants' motion for summary
judgment, the trial court concluded that the defense of limitations had been
established by showing the date the cause of action arose, the date the plain-
tiff's petition was filed, and the date that issuance of citation was requested.
Reversing the summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the supreme
court held that "[w]here the non-movant interposes a suspension statute .. .
or pleads diligence in requesting issuance of citation, the limitation defense
is not conclusively established until the movant meets his burden of negating
the applicability of these issues." 5
Article 2226, 7 which authorizes the recovery of attorney's fees in specified
cases, was amended in 1971 to provide that "[t]he amount prescribed in
the current State Bar Minimum Fee Schedule shall be prima facie evi-
dence of reasonable attorney's fees," and that "[t]he court, in non-jury cases,
may take judicial knowledge of such schedule and of the contents of the
case file in determining the amount of attorney's fees without the necessity
of hearing further evidence." Prior to this amendment, it was well settled
that the reasonableness of an attorney's fee-an issue of fact-could only
be established by opinion evidence, and that opinion adduced by affidavit
on a motion for summary judgment was insufficient to establish such fact
as a matter of law. 77 Resolving a conflict in the decisions of the courts of
civil appeals, 78 the Texas Supreme Court in Coward v. Gateway National
Bank79 concluded that the "prima facie evidence" of a reasonable attorney's
fee established by the fee schedule was insufficient to sustain the burden of
a movant under rule 166-A80 with respect to the reasonableness issue.
74. 520 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. 1975) (per curiam).
75. Id. at 891.
76. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Supp. 1975-76).
77. See, e.g., Gibbs v. General Motors Corp., 450 S.W.2d 827 (Tex. 1970); Lan-
caster v. Wynnewood State Bank, 470 S.W.2d 78 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971, no writ).
But see Bagby Land & Cattle Co. v. California Livestock Comm'n Co., 439 F.2d 315,
318 (5th Cir. 1971).
78. Compare Coward v. Gateway Nat'l Bank, 515 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1974), rev'd, 525 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. 1975), McDonald v. Newlywed's, Inc.,
483 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and Superior Sta-
tioners Corp. v. Berol Corp., 483 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1972,
no writ), with Stafford v. Brennan, 498 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1973, no writ), and Duncan v. Butterowe, Inc., 474 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1971, no writ).
79. 525 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. 1975).
80. TEx. R. Civ. P. 166-A.
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Rule 166-A, which governs summary judgment practice, stipulates that
"[slupporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge,
shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matter stated
therein." 8' Reviewing an affidavit which stated "'[u]pon the default . . .
in the payment of the note,'" the entire unpaid balance of principal and
accrued interest was declared immediately due and payable, the Dallas court
of civil appeals held that such statement amounted to a legal conclusion and
could not support a summary judgment since the note specified several oc-
currences which would amount to a "default" under its terms.8 2
VIII. SPECIAL ISSUE SUBMISSION
Several decisions during the survey period focused on the scope of submis-
sion of special issues under rule 277.83 Abolishing the former requirement
that special issues be submitted distinctly and separately,8 4 rule 277 now pro-
vides that "[it] shall be discretionary with the court whether to submit sepa-
rate questions with respect to each element of a case or to submit issues
broadly," and that "[i]t shall not be objectionable that a question is general
or includes a combination of elements or issues."'8 5 Giving this language full
effect, the Dallas court of civil appeals, in Shasteen v. Mid-Continent Re-
frigerator Co.,8 6 approved the submission of the defense of fraudulent repre-
sentation in a single issue.8 7 However, the holding in Shasteen should not
be construed to be an indication that under rule 277 a general issue would
never be subject to the objection that it is prejudicially multifarious. The
court cautioned that a different question would have been posed if the jury
had answered the issue in the affirmative rather than in the negative and
the plaintiff had appealed on the basis that the issue was prejudicial in per-
mitting the jury to consider representations pleaded but not raised by the
evidence or to consider promissory statements legally insufficient as grounds
of fraud. 8 In such a situation the court concluded that it would have to
determine whether any harm to the plaintiff resulted from the general lan-
guage of the issue.
Faced with the question posed but not decided in Shasteen, a Houston
court of civil appeals in Members Mutual Insurance Co. v. Muckeroyso ap-
81. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166-A(e).
82. Skeen v. Glenn Justice Mortgage Co., 526 S.W.2d 252, 254 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1975, no writ), noted in 29 Sw. L.J. 959 (1975).
83. TEX. R. Civ. P. 277.
84. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 277 (1967). See also Fox v. Dallas Hotel Co., 111 Tex.
461, 240 S.W. 517 (1922).
85. TEx. R., Civ. P. 277; see Pope & Lowerre, Revised Rule 277-A Better Special
Verdict System for Texas, 27 Sw. L.J. 577 (1973).
86. 517 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
87. The single issue submission approved by the court inquired: "Do you find from
a preponderance of the evidence that prior to the signing of the written agreement in
question in this case the representative of the Plaintiff made false representations as to
material facts to the Defendant with the intent of inducing him to sign said agreement?"
id. at 438. The jury answered the issue in the negative. Id.
88. Id. at 439.
89. 523 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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pears to have concluded that a general submission will never be prejudicially
multifarious. Over the defendant's objection that it failed to limit the jury
to a consideration of the specific acts and omissions of negligence alleged,90
the trial court submitted a special issue to the jury inquiring "Whose negli-
gence, if any, do you find from a preponderance of the evidence proximately
caused the collision made the basis of this suit?" 91 The issue was followed
by three possible answers: the defendant, the plaintiff, or both. Following
a finding on the issue and entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the
defendant appealed. The court of civil appeals, relying on a statement by
the supreme court in an earlier case,92 held that "the trial court is not pre-
cluded from submitting issues broadly under Rule 277 even though specific
acts or omissions comprising the elements of such issue have been specifically
plead." 93
Muckelroy is also informative in its treatment of limiting instructions where
a general submission is used. The defendant, in an effort to restrict the scope
of the negligence issue, had requested the trial court to give the jury instruc-
tions limiting their consideration of negligence to the acts and omissions al-
leged. Conceding that "an instruction limiting the jury's consideration to
only those acts of negligence pleaded might properly be given by the trial
court in an appropriate situation, ' 94 the court nevertheless found that the
trial court had not abused its discretion in refusing to give the limiting instruc-
tions requested by the defendant.
Rule 27795 provides that "[t]he court may submit special issues in a negli-
gence case in a manner that allows a listing of the claimed acts or omissions
of any party to an accident, event, or occurrence that are raised by the plead-
ings and the evidence with appropriate spaces for answers as to each act
90. Specifically, the defendant contended that "notwithstanding the revision of Rule
277, the issues must be limited by the form of submission to those specific acts of negli-
gence which are specially alleged in the pleadings" and that the issue "permitted the jury
to consider evidence of other possible negligent acts not raised by the pleadings, as for
example, testimony from which the jury might have inferred that [defendant] had been
drinking prior to the accident and that she had failed to give a turn signal indicating
her intended left turn." Id. at 82.
91. Id. at 79.
92. In Mobil Chem. Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 255 (Tex. 1974), with reference
to rule 277, the Texas Supreme Court had observed that: "The rule means that in an
ordinary negligence case, where several specific acts of negligence are alleged and evi-
dence as to each is introduced, the submission of a broad issue inquiring generally
whether the defendant was negligent is not error and is not subject to the objection that
the single issue inquires about several elements or issues."
93. 523 S.W.2d at 82. In addressing the defendant's contentions, the court stated
that:
The purpose of the pleadings is to apprise the opposing parties of the na-
ture of the issues which they will be expected to meet. By appropriate
special exceptions, the plaintiff may be required to specify the particular
acts or omissions of negligence upon which he relies. If during the trial
evidence is offered regarding any claimed acts or omissions not raised by
the pleadings, the receipt of such evidence may be properly controlled by
ruling of the court. Under the revised rule, where the broad form of sub-
mission is adopted, the extent of the jury's consideration of the elements
comprising the controlling issue becomes a matter of evidence and argu-
ment, subject to appropriate instruction of the court.
Id.
94. Id. at 83.
95. TEx. R. Civ. P. 277.
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or omission which is listed." Focusing on this provision, the court in Muckel-
roy further concluded that while rule 277 authorizes the use of a checklist
submission, the trial court is not required to adopt that form of submission.
Even though rule 277 authorizes special issues to be submitted broadly,
the court in Cactus Drilling Co. v. Williams9" held that the submission of
a special issue which assumes a disputed fact or is phrased so as to elicit
an ambiguous response is defective and constitutes reversible error.
Stacks v. Rushing97 presented an unusual situation. Although the trial
court submitted an ambiguous issue to the jury,98 the plaintiff made no ob-
jection to it prior to the reading of the charge to the jury. During its de-
liberation, the jury wrote the trial court a note inquiring as to the meaning
of the issue and seeking a clarifying instruction. Over the objection of the
plaintiff, the trial court responded that no further instructions concerning the
issue could be given. Observing that rule 28691 authorized the trial court
to give a clarifying instruction, the court of civil appeals concluded that the
failure of the trial court to do so constituted reversible error, as the note
from the jury demonstrated that the issue was ambiguous. Although the
plaintiff's failure to object to the original submission of the issue on grounds
of ambiguity constituted a waiver of such objection, this waiver did not ex-
tend to the objection made to the trial court's response to the note.
IX. JURY PRACTICE
Stephens County Museum, Inc. v. Swenson,100 a recent decision of the
Texas Supreme Court, confirms the principle that a misinterpretation or mis-
understanding of the charge on the part of the jury does not constitute jury
misconduct. Two elderly sisters brought suit to set aside certain contribu-
tions they had made to a museum, claiming that they did not understand
the nature of the transactions and were unduly influenced. After the jury
found that the sisters did not understand the transactions and that they were
acting under undue influence when they made the contributions, the defend-
ants filed a motion for new trial complaining of jury misconduct. At the
hearing on the motion the foreman of the jury testified that the jury reasoned
that if the sisters did not understand the nature and subject matter of each
96. 525 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
97. 518 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
98. The special issue asked whether "defendant . . . agreed or promised to repair
the floor in question on or before February 9, 1972." Id. at 613. The issue submitted
was ambiguous in the wordings as to whether the question concerned the date on which
the alleged promise was made or the date upon which the promised action was to occur.
99. TEx. R. Civ. P. 286, which governs the submission of supplemental instructions
to the jury, provides that:
After having retired, the jury may receive further instructions of the court
touching any matter of law, either at their request or upon the court's own
motion. For this purpose they shall appear before the judge in open court
in a body, and if the instruction is being given at their request, they shall
through their foreman state to the court, in writing, the particular question
of law upon which they desire further instruction. The court shall give
such instruction in writing, but no 'instruction shall be given except in
conformity with the rules relating to the charge. Additional argument
may be allowed in the discretion of the court.




transaction, it would necessarily follow that they had been unduly influ-
enced. 10 1 Concluding that the conduct of the jury in this case was an effort
on its part to follow its own reasoning, rather than properly applying the
court's charge, the supreme court held that it is not misconduct to misinter-
pret or misunderstand the court's charge. 10 2
Heddin v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Co. 10 3 is a warning that photographs which
are calculated to arouse the sympathy, prejudice, or passion of the jury and
do not serve to illustrate disputed issues or aid the jury in its understanding
of the case should not be shown to the jury. A pipeline company brought
an action against landowners to condemn land for the purpose of laying a
gas transmission pipeline. Over the objection of the pipeline company, the
landowners introduced several photographs of the carcasses of cattle and
family pets killed by gas which had escaped when another gas transmission
pipeline ruptured eight months after the date of taking. Observing that the
photographs had no relevance to the disputed issues, the supreme court con-
cluded, by examining the method of proof, that the pictures were introduced
for their shock value, rather than to rebut an implication that the pipeline
was not dangerous. As a result, the court found that the showing of the
photographs to the jury probably caused the rendition of an improper judg-
ment.
X. JUDGMENT
Adding to an existing conflict in the decisions of the courts of civil ap-
peals, 10 4 the court in Morgan Express, Inc. v. Elizabeth-Perkins, Inc.10 5 con-
demned the entry of a default judgment on a claim for unliquidated damages
where no record of the supporting evidence had been made in the trial court.
Under rule 241106 a default does not have the effect of admitting allegations
of damages unless the claim is liquidated and proved by an instrument in
writing. If the claim is unliquidated, rule 243107 stipulates that "the court
shall hear evidence as to damages." The defaulting defendant in Morgan
Express, Inc. formally requested a statement of facts on the presentation
of plaintiff's evidence on his unliquidated claim, but the reporter certified
that he was unable to comply with the request because he was not present
when the evidence was given and no other reporter recorded the testimony.
101. The relevant testimony of the foreman of the jury is set forth in the opinion
of the court of civil appeals. 499 S.W.2d at 684-85.
102. 517 S.W.2d at 260; accord, Adams v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 158 Tex.
551, 314 S.W.2d 826 (1958); Whited v. Powell, 155 Tex. 210, 285 S.W.2d 364 (1956);
see Burchfield v. Tanner, 142 Tex. 404, 178 S.W.2d 681 (1944).
103. 522 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. 1975).
104. Compare Parker v. Sabine Valley Lumber Co., 485 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1972, no writ), Harris v. Lebow, 363 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.), and Johnson v. Brown, 218 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.), with Mitchell v. Hunsaker Mfg., Inc., 520 S.W.2d 796
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ), Dugie v. Dugie, 511 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1974, no writ), and James Edmond, Inc. v. Schilling, 501 S.W.2d
432 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973, no writ).
105. 525 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd), followed in Wallace
v. Snyder Nat'l Bank, 527 S.W.2d 485 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
106. Tax. R. CIv. P. 241.
107. TEx. R. Civ. P. 243.
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If the trial court has an official reporter, article 2324108 requires him to
"[a].ttend all sessions of the court" and to "take full shorthand notes of all
oral testimony offered." When the reporter fails to comply with article 2324,
the court concluded in Morgan Express, Inc., the default judgment must be
set aside and the case remanded for a new trial. 109 Furthermore, the de-
faulting defendant is not required to show that he was unable to obtain a
statement of facts by agreement or by request of the trial judge. 110 In this
regard, the court observed that "an appellant who was not present and was
not represented when the testimony was taken is in no position to agree with
his opponent concerning the substance of the testimony, and neither should
he be required to rely on the unaided memory of the trial judge, who, though
presumably fair, has already decided the merits of the case against the appel-
lant." '11 1 Since an application for writ of error was refused by the supreme
court, the principles of law announced in Morgan Express, Inc. should be
considered as having been correctly determined."
2
Frymire Engineering Co. v. Grantham'13 confirmed the principle that
where the defendant has filed an answer, the plaintiff is required to prove
his case even though the defendant fails to appear at the trial. "If de-
fendant has filed an answer placing in issue the merits of plaintiff's cause
of action," reasoned the supreme court, "defendant's failure to appear at the
trial is neither an abandonment of defendant's answer nor is it an implied
confession of any issues thus joined by the defendant's answer. 1" 4
In order to set aside a final judgment through the use of an equitable bill
of review, the landmark decision of Alexander v. Hagedorn"5 established
that the party seeking such relief "must allege and prove: (1) a meritorious
defense to the cause of action alleged to support the judgment, (2) which
he was prevented from making by the fraud, accident or wrongful act of
the opposite party, (3) unmixed with any fault or negligence of his own."'' 1 6
Reviewing an appeal from a bill of review judgment, the supreme court re-
cently approved a holding "that proof of defendant not having been served
with citation obviates the necessity of pleading and proving the second Hage-
dorn requirement."1 7
Plains Growers, Inc. v. Jordan,"1 8 a sharply divided decision of the su-
preme court during a previous survey period, opened a Pandora's box of pro-
108. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2324 (1971). Furthermore, the trial judge has
the responsibility to see that the reporter complies with art. 2324. Ex parte Thompson,
520 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas, no writ), modified, 529 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1975, no writ).
109. Note that the opinion is unclear as to whether a new trial is to be given on
the liability issue as well as the issue of damages.
110. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 377.
111. 525 S.W.2d at 315.
112. TEX. R. Civ. P. 483; see, e.g., Hamilton ,v. Empire Gas & Fuel Co., 134 Tex.
377, 383, 110 S.W.2d 561, 565-66 (1937); Ohler v. Trinity Portland Cement Co., 181
S.W.2d 120, 123 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1944, no writ).
113. 524 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. 1975) (per curiam).
114. Id. at 681.
115. 148 Tex. 565, 226 S.W.2d 996 (1950).
116. Id. at 568-69, 226 S.W.2d at 998.
117. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Sanchez, 525 S.W.2d 870, 871 (Tex. 1975) (per curiam).
118. 519 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. 1974) (5-4 decision).
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cedural ills. 119 To remedy these ills, rule 245120 was amended to provide
that "[t]he court may set contested cases on motion of any party, or on the
court's own motion, with reasonable notice of not less than 10 days to the
parties, or by agreement of the parties." Thus, notice to the parties must
be given whether the trial judge or a party moves to set the case for trial.
Furthermore, amended rule 245 dictates that "[w]ith respect to a party who
had no notice of setting of a contested case for trial, the provisions of Rule
329b governing motions for new trial and finality of judgments shall operate
from the time of receipt of notice of rendition of the judgment; provided
that the original motion for new trial shall in any event be filed within 90
days from the rendition of judgment."
Two other developments in the area of judgments should be of interest
to the trial attorney. First, in order to keep pace with rising interest rates,
article 5069121 was amended to provide that "[a]ll judgments of the courts
of this State shall bear interest at the rate of nine percent per annum from
and after the date of the judgment." Second, as a result of the recent
amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, an execution upon a
judgment may not be issued by the clerk until after the expiration of thirty
days from the rendition of a final judgment and after the overruling of any
motion for new trial. 122
XI. MOTION FOR NEw TRIAL
In a step toward judicial economy, rule 320,123 which governs motion for
new trial practice, was amended to authorize a retrial on less than all of
the matters in controversy. Thus, "[w]here it appears to the court that a
new trial should be granted on a ground or grounds that affect only a part
of the matters in controversy and that such part is clearly separable without
unfairness to the parties, the court may grant a new trial as to that part
only.' 24  However, "a separate trial on unliquidated damages alone shall
119. During a monthly call of its docket, the trial court, on request of the plaintiff's
counsel, set the case for trial within an hour. The defendant's counsel, who resided in
another county, was not notified of the trial setting. The case was called for trial at
the time set, evidence was presented, and judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff.
The postcard notice of the judgment required by TEX. R. Civ. P. 306d was mailed by
the clerk on the tenth day after entry of the judgment and received by defendant's coun-
sel the following day. On the sixteenth day, the defendant filed a motion for new trial
contending that the judgment, entered without notice of the trial setting and without al-
lowing an adequate opportunity to prepare for trial, was void. Under former TEx. R.
Civ. P. 330(b), "by agreement of the parties, or on motion of either party, or on the
court's own motion with notice to the parties, the court may set any case for trial at
any time so as to allow the parties reasonable time for preparation." On the basis of
the comma following the words "either party," a majority of the court concluded that
former rule 330(b) required notice to the parties only when a case is set by the trial
court on its own motion. Consequently, since the judgment was not void, the majority
of the court concluded that it could not be collaterally attacked. See Figari, Texas Civil
Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 265, 280 (1975).
120. TEx. R. Civ. P. 245. Additionally, TEx. R. CIv. P. 330(b) was repealed ef-
fective January 1, 1976.
121. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.05 (Supp. 1975-76).
122. TEx. R. Civ. P. 627.
123. TEx. R. Civ. P. 320; see TEx. R. Civ. P. 434, 503. See generally Pope &
Sheehan, "Try, Try, Again . . ."-A Proposal To Limit the Scope of New Trials in
Texas, 7 ST. MARY's L.J. 1 (1975).
124. TEX. R. Civ. P. 320.
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not be ordered if liability issues are contested.' ' 25
XII. APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Prior to 1973 the Texas Constitution 126 provided for appellate jurisdiction
in probate matters in the district court. The Probate Code reiterated in sec-
tion 5127 the appellate jurisdiction of the district court, authorized in section
28128 a right of appeal from the probate court to the district court, and pro-
vided in section 30129 that the proceeding in the county court could be cor-
rected by certiorari. In 1973 the Texas Constitution and section 5 of the
Probate Code were amended to provide that all appeals from the county
court in probate matters shall be to the court of civil appeals. 130  In Cluck
v. Hester'31 the Texas Supreme Court concluded that section 28 of the Pro-
bate Code was repealed through implication by the 1973 amendment to sec-
tion 5 and that a right of appeal from the probate court to the district court
no longer exists. Noting that appeal and certiorari are concurrent and al-
ternative remedies, however, the court concluded that section 30 was not re-
pealed by implication and that review of probate matters in the district court
by certiorari still obtained. 132 Following the decision in Cluck, the legislature
repealed section 30 of the Probate Code133 and eliminated review by certio-
rari of probate matters in the district court.
Prior to its amendment rule 386'13 stipulated:
In appeal or writ of error the appellant shall file the transcript and
statement of facts with the clerk of the Court of Civil Appeals within
sixty days from the rendition of the final judgment or order overruling
motion for new trial, or perfection of writ of error; provided [that] by
motion filed before, at, or within a reasonable time, not exceeding fifteen
days after the expiration of such sixty-day period, . . . ,the Court of
Civil Appeals may permit the same to be thereafter filed upon such
terms as it shall prescribe.
Due to the wording of rule 386, the cases having interpreted it were not
always in agreement as to whether it empowered the court of civil appeals
to grant a second motion for extension of time filed after the period fixed
by a first extension order had expired. 13 5  Resolving the conflict, the Su-
125. Id. See generally Iley v. Hughes, 158 Tex. 362, 311 S.W.2d 648 (1958).
126. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8 (1876).
127. Ch. 55, § 5, [1955] Tex. Laws 91.
128. Ch. 55, § 28, [1955] Tex. Laws 97.
129. Ch. 55, § 30, [1955] Tex. Laws 97.
130. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8; TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 5(e) (Supp. 1975-76). As a
result, TEX. R. Civ. P. 332-39, which governed the review of county court rulings by
appeal to the district courts, were repealed.
131. 521 S.W.2d 845 (Tex. 1975); accord, Butts v. Ailshie, 521 S.W.2d 155 (Tex.
Civ. App.-El Paso 1975, no writ).
132. 521 S.W.2d at 847-48.
133. Ch. 701, § 7, [1975] Tex. Laws 2197. Rendered unnecessary by the elimina-
tion of TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 30, TEX. R. Civ. P. 344-51, which governed the review
by district courts of county court rulings by certiorari, were repealed.
134. TEX. R. Civ. P. 386 (1967).
135. Compare First Nat'l Bank v. Hargrove, 503 S.W.2d 856 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tex-
arkana 1973, no writ), Western United Realty Co. v. Shaw, 356 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1962, writ ref'd), and Hodges v. Nix, 225 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1949, writ ref'd n.r.e.), with Allen v. United Supermarkets, Inc., 467
19761
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
preme Court of Texas, in Crites v. Court of 'Civil Appeals, 38 concluded that
a court of civil appeals has jurisdiction to entertain a second motion for ex-
tension of time filed after expiration of the period set forth in the first exten-
sion order. The court reasoned that once a motion for extension has been
filed during the seventy-five day period, the jurisdiction of the court of civil
appeals has been invoked to grant further extensions. 137
In order to eliminate the problem encountered in Crites and to liberalize
the requirements for obtaining extensions of time on appeal, rule 21c13 8 was
enacted. It provides that "[t]he failure of a party to timely file a transcript,
statement of facts, motion for rehearing in the court of civil appeals or appli-
cation for writ of error, will not authorize a dismissal or loss of the appeal
if the defaulting party files a motion reasonably explaining such failure in
the court whose jurisdiction to make the next ruling in the case would be
affected by such failure." The motion seeking the extension "must be filed
within fifteen (15) days of the last date for timely filing . . . although it
may be acted upon by the court at a date thereafter." In light of the addi-
tion of rule 21c, the language of rule 386139 which had caused confusion
was deleted.
Texas State Board of Public Accountancy v. Fulcher140 is a comment on
the United States mail service. Rule 5141 provided that if "any matter relat-
ing to taking an appeal or writ of error from the trial court to any higher
court . . . is sent to the proper clerk by first-class United States mail in
an envelope or wrapper properly addressed and stamped and is deposited
in the mail one day or more before the last day for filing same . . . the
same, if received by the clerk not more than ten days tardily, shall be filed
by the clerk and be deemed filed in time." Significantly, "a legible postmark
affixed by the United States Postal Service," continued rule 5, "shall be con-
clusive evidence of the date of mailing."' 142 Attempting to take advantage
of rule 5, the defendant deposited the envelope containing his motion for
rehearing, properly addressed and stamped, in the United States mail on Oc-
tober 2, two days prior to the date it was required to be filed with the clerk
of the court of civil appeals. The envelope was subsequently received by
the clerk on October 7. Due to mechanical difficulties encountered by the
United States postal service, however, the envelope was postmarked October
4, the date the motion was required to be filed. Refusing to give the post-
mark "conclusive" effect, the court in Fulcher deemed the motion for rehear-
ing timely filed, observing "that the mails, since the original adoption of Rule
5 and the several amendments thereto, have become increasingly erratic and
undependable.' 1 43 In order to eliminate any future problems in this regard,
S.W.2d 616 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1971, no writ), and Walker v. Kelley, 395
S.W.2d 402 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1965, no writ).
136. 516 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. 1974).
137. Id. at 124-25, quoting Parks v. Purnell, 135 Tex. 182, 141 S.W.2d 585 (1940).
138. TEx. R. Civ. P. 21c; see TEx. R. CIv. P. 386.
139. TEx. R. Civ. P. 386.
140. 515 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
141. TEx. R. Civ. P. 5 (Supp. 1973).
142. Id. (emphasis added).
143. 515 S.W.2d at 958.
[Vol. 30
TEXAS CIVIL PROCEDURE
rule 5144 was amended so "that a legible postmark affixed by the United
States Postal Service shall be prima facie evidence of the date of mailing."
Construing rule 430145 liberally, the supreme court, in Woods Exploration
& Producing Co. v. Arkla Equipment Co.,146 has held that "the clerk's certi-
ficate showing that a deposit has been made in lieu of an appeal bond may,
when warranted by the facts, be amended to show that the deposit was made
for the benefit of parties not named in the original certificate."'147 Three
defendants, an individual and two corporations, each gave timely notice of
appeal and, in lieu of a bond for costs on appeal, the individual defendant
deposited a cashier's check with the clerk. The clerk's certificate, made pur-
suant to rule 354,148 stated merely that the deposit was made by the indi-
vidual defendant, without reference to the other defendants. Although the
court of civil appeals concluded that only the individual defendant had per-
fected an appeal, the supreme court analogized the clerk's certificate in re-
gard to the deposit in lieu of an appeal bond to an appeal bond itself. Al-
though no rules specifically allow amendment of such certificates, the policy
and reasoning behind rule 430 convinced the court that the clerk's certificate
should likewise be amendable.
An oral notice of appeal which was given at the conclusion of a hearing
on a motion for summary judgment was held by one court of civil appeals
to be premature and ineffective where the order granting the summary judg-
ment was not signed until some time later. 149 Although rule 306c 50 provides
that a prematurely filed notice of appeal shall be deemed to have been filed
on the date of but subsequent to the rendition of the judgment, the court
found this rule to be applicable only to written notices of appeal.
In Tejas Trail Property Owners Ass'n v. Holt151 a letter written by the
trial judge to the attorneys in the case advising them of his ruling and the
reasons for his decision was held not to constitute the findings of fact and
conclusions of law of the trial court contemplated by rule 296,152 even though
the letter was included in the transcript.
Rule 272153 previously required that when objections to the charge of the
trial court are dictated to the court reporter, they must be transcribed, the
court's ruling endorsed thereon, and filed with the clerk "in time to be in-
cluded in the transcript." Construing former rule 272 strictly, the Waco
court of civil appeals in Southland Capital Corp. v. Clark 54 refused to con-
sider objections which were not transcribed until after the appeal had been
144. TEX. R. Civ. P. 5 (emphasis added).
145. TEX. R. Civ. P. 430 provides that: "When there is a defect of substance or form
in any appeal or writ of error bond, then on motion to dismiss the same for such defect,
the appellate court may allow the same to be amended by filing in such appellate court
a new bond, on such terms as the court may prescribe."
146. 528 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. 1975).
147. Id. at 569.
148. TEX. R. Civ. P. 354 (1967).
149. Texas Gulf Coast Constr. Co. v. Houston Shell & Concrete, 517 S.W.2d 650
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
150. TEx. R. Civ. P. 306c.
151. 516 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974, no writ).
152. TEX. R. Civ. P. 296.
153. TEX. R. Civ. P. 272 (1967).
154. 526 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ).
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perfected and were contained in a second supplemental transcript. Super-
seding the holding in Clark, 'amended rule 272155 states that "[o]bjections
to the charge and the court's rulings thereon may be included as a part of
any transcript or statement of facts on appeal and, when so included in either,
shall constitute a sufficient bill of exception to the rulings of the court
thereon."
The new amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure made sweep-
ing changes in the area of appellate procedure. The giving of a notice of
appeal has been eliminated as an appellate step except when a bond for costs
on appeal is not required or the appellant seeks to limit the scope of an ap-
peal to a specified portion of the judgment from which the appeal is taken. 156
An appeal is now perfected through the filing of a bond or cash deposit se-
curing costs on appeal within thirty days after rendition of the judgment or
order overruling motion for new trial. 15 7 When the bond is in the sum of
$500 no approval of it by the court is necessary. 158 The transcript and state-
ment of facts still must be filed within sixty days from the rendition of judg-
ment or order overruling motion for new trial, 59 unless the time is extended
pursuant to rule 21c. 160
XIII. PREJUDGMENT REMEDIES
Article 6840,161 which was recently amended in an attempt to avoid the
deficiencies of its predecessor, 6 2 authorizes the issuance of a writ of seques-
tration in specified cases. The application for the issuance of the writ is
required to be made under oath and set forth "specific facts" stating the na-
ture of the claim, the amount in controversy, and the facts justifying the is-
suance. 163 Moreover, when a writ of sequestration has been issued under
article 6840, the defendant may seek a dissolution of the writ by written
motion filed with the court. A hearing on the motion to dissolve the writ
must be held and the issue determined not later than ten days after the mo-
tion is filed. At the hearing, the court is required to dissolve the writ "unless
the party who secured the issuance of the writ proves the specific facts alleged
and the grounds relied upon for its issuance."'16 4 Although the sequestration
statute was amended, rules 696-716,165 dealing with procedure in sequestra-
tion actions, were left unchanged by the recent amendments to the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure.
155. TEX. R. Civ. P. 272 (emphasis added).
156. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 353, 354, 358, 363, 376, 377, 386, 388.
157. TEx. R. Civ. P. 356, 363.
158. TEx. R. Civ. P. 354.
159. TEx. R. Civ. P. 386.
160. TEX. R. Ov. P. 21c.
161. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6840 (Supp. 1975-76); see Comment, Constitu-
tional Dimensions of the Amended Texas Sequestration Statute, 29 Sw. L.J. 884 (1975).
162. Ch. 121, §§ 1-6, [1866] Tex. Laws 120-22, 5 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS
1038-40 (1898), as amended by ch. 44, § 1, [1887] Tex. Laws 30-31, 9 H. GAMMEL,
LAws OF TEXAS 828-29 (1899) (formerly TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6840 (1960));
see Garcia v. Krausse, 380 F. Supp. 1254, 1259 (S.D. Tex. 1974). See also North Geor-
gia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,
416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
163. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6840, § 2 (Supp. 1975-76).
164. Id. § 3.
165. TEX. R. Civ. P. 696-716.
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A court of civil appeals had concluded during a previous survey period
that the Texas statute' 66 permitting prejudgment garnishment was unconstitu-
tional as being violative of the due process requirements of the fourteenth
amendment. 167 Although arising in the context of a wrongful garnishment
action, the same court has concluded that its earlier decision "should not be
retroactively applied so as to make a garnishment wrongful that had been
obtained in good faith."'16 8
XIV. MISCELLANEOUS
Article 8.18 of the Texas Business Corporation Act,' 6 9 which pertains to
suits by foreign corporations doing business in Texas, provides that "[n]o
foreign corporation which is transacting, or has transacted, business in this
State without a certificate of authority shall be permitted to maintain any
action . . . in any court of this State on any cause of action arising out of
the transaction of business in this State, until such corporation shall have
obtained a certificate of authority." Relying on article 8.18, the defendant
in Troyan v. Snelling & Snelling, Inc.170 asserted a plea in abatement to the
action contending that it arose out of intrastate business conducted by the
plaintiff without the required certificate of authority. Observing that the
plea had been filed on the eve of trial, the trial court deferred ruling on
the matter until the conclusion of the evidence. After the return of a jury
verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the trial court entered an order that the plea
was granted to the extent that entry of final judgment was postponed for
thirty days. The order also provided that on failure of the plaintiff to file
the required certificate within the specified period, the action would be dis-
missed, but that on filing of such certificate a final judgment granting the
relief sought would be entered. The following day the plaintiff filed the re-
quired certificate, and the trial court entered a final judgment in favor of
the plaintiff. On appeal, noting that "the primary objective of the . . . stat-
ute is to encourage such a corporation to obtain authority rather than to
penalize it for doing business without authority,"' 7' the Dallas court of civil
appeals commended the ingenuity of the trial court, observing that its ap-
proach "avoided disruption of the docket," "was fair to both parties," and
"accomplished the purpose of the statute."'1 72
The stage of trial before which the plaintiff may take a nonsuit has been
166. TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 4084 (1966). See also id. art. 4076; TEX. R.
Civ. P. 657-79.
167. Southwestern Warehouse Corp. v. Wee Tote, Inc., 504 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ); see Garcia v. Krausse, 380 F. Supp. 1254
(S.D. Tex. 1974). See generally North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419
U.S. 601 (1975), noted in 29 Sw. L.J. 660 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416
U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp.,
395 U.S. 337 (1969).
168. Whittenburg v. Whittington, 523 S.W.2d 441, 444 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
169. TEx. Bus. CoRP. AcT ANN. art. 8.18 (1956) (emphasis added).
170. 524 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ); see Acme Color Art
Printing Co. v. Brown, 488 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
171. 524 S.W.2d at 434.
172. Id. at 435.
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the subject of a prolonged controversy. The prior Texas rule, which allowed
a nonsuit to be taken "[a]t any time before the jury has retired" or when
the case is tried by the judge, "at any time before the decision is an-
nounced,"'1 73 represented the common law view that a plaintiff should be al-
lowed complete control over his case. Although this liberal right to nonsuit
was necessary at common law to preserve valid claims which would other-
wise have been dismissed for technical pleading errors, the principle was out-
moded by modern pleading practices and the elimination of surprise through
discovery.' 74 'Liberal or unlimited nonsuit rules have been criticized 175 for
exposing defendants to undue expense and the harassment of preparing for
a trial which may not dispose of the case. Such rules may also be misused
by plaintiffs to "discover" the opposition's case and gain other tactical advan-
tages not available to defendant. In addition, the waste of court and jury
time is a serious concern under liberal nonsuit rules.
Presumably recognizing these criticisms, the supreme court has changed the
procedure relating to the taking of a nonsuit. In contrast to the earlier rule,
amended rule 164176 now permits a nonsuit to be taken "at any time before
plaintiff has rested his case," that is, "has introduced all of his evidence other
than rebuttal evidence."
173. TEx. R. Civ. P. 164 (1967). This very liberal nonsuit provision was liberally
construed by the Texas Supreme Court. In Smith v. Columbian Carbon Co., 145 Tex.
478, 198 S.W.2d 727 (1947), the court permitted a nonsuit where plaintiff moved for
nonsuit after the trial judge announced in chambers his decision to grant defendant's mo-
tion for instructed verdict and returned to the bench to instruct the jury, but before the
instruction and charge were read to the jury.
174. Corresponding to the liberal pleading and discovery rules under federal practice,
federal rule 41(a)(1), effective since 1948, limits the plaintiff's right to absolute dismis-
sal to an earlier point than most states. Rule 41(a)(1) permits voluntary dismissal by
the plaintiff "(i) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse
party of an answer or of a motion for summary judgment, whichever first occurs, or
(ii) by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared in the
action." FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1); see Note, Absolute Dismissal Under Federal Rule
41(a): The Disappearing Right of Voluntary Nonsuit, 63 YALE L.J. 738 (1954).
175. See, e.g., Sweeney, Nonsuit in Virginia, 52 VA. L. REv. 751, 766-68 (1966);
Note, Civil Procedure-Stage of Trial Before Which Voluntary Nonsuit May Be Taken,
26 TEXAS L. REV. 91 (1947).
176. Tex. R. Civ. P. 164,
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